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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) and future medical doctor I often 
wonder how prepared our nation is to effectively respond to disasters.  I have volunteered 
on ambulances in New York and in Pennsylvania but my curiosity turned to 
disappointment after I volunteered overseas on ambulances in the State of Israel.  I 
noticed a fundamental difference between American and Israeli preparedness.  In Israel, 
every volunteer and employee understood his role during a disaster and knew exactly 
what to expect from other agencies.  Everyone understood how Magen David Adom, the 
Israeli ambulance service, would coordinate with the military’s Homefront Command 
and was prepared to quickly transition from normal to disaster operations.  Furthermore, 
even local resources such as the ambulance dispatch centers were designed to withstand 
largescale disasters and, if needed, could even be quickly relocated to underground 
bunkers.   
 In contrast, if you surveyed my American colleagues, you would find little to no 
understanding of the disaster response system.  Virtually nobody has read the 426 page 
all-hazards plan titled the National Response Plan, and with the exception of some major 
cities, few emergency response agencies have reinforced or protected emergency 
infrastructure.  In attempt to correct this problem, as of October 2005, the federal 
government began requiring that all local and state emergency response organizations 
adopt the federal incident command recommendations.  Each agency was required to 
demonstrate that all employees completed a series of federal incident command classes to 
remain eligible for federal emergency preparedness dollars.  However, even this 
requirement has been loosely enforced since it can be fulfilled through short online 
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courses for which the test answer keys are widely circulated.  From my experience, the 
plan has not become a part of the institutional culture, is rarely reviewed during in-
service training, and is criticized by most people for being so complex as to be 
impractical. 
 While the disaster response system may be adequate in small-scale disasters when 
a handful of agencies must coordinate, as I embarked on this research project I became 
astonished by our nation’s striking lack of preparedness.  Disasters often strike with 
limited or no warning, and by definition they result in large-scale death, destruction, and 
mass hysteria.  They often have long-lasting and large-scale economic, political, and 
psychological effects.  While individual disasters may not be predictable, we can be 
assured that another disaster will occur in the not too distant future.  It may come in the 
form of a hurricane, earthquake, tsunami, or other natural disaster; or, it may be the result 
of an intentional human act such as war, terrorism, bioterrorism, or some yet unforeseen 
destructive act.  The American public and political officials have a choice.  They can 
continue, however illogical, to live in denial that another destructive event is 
forthcoming, or they can learn from the past and finally create a political and bureaucratic 
system capable of curtailing destructive effects. 
 Despite having responded to thousands of natural disasters and numerous terrorist 
attacks, at present the United States government at the federal, state, and local levels is 
exceedingly unprepared to handle the immediate aftereffects of disasters.  The federal 
government has created numerous large bureaucracies and congressional panels as well 
as generated hundreds of official reports each of which purports to detail appropriate 
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disaster response guidelines.  Nonetheless, the improvements since the first disaster 
response plan was implemented during World War I are not palpable.   
 During the most recent major Hurricanes – Katrina and Rita – despite having 
significant advanced notice of the impending natural disaster as well as years of 
investigative reports warning about the fragility of the New Orleans levy system, the 
disaster response system failed the citizens of Louisiana and the Gulf Coast.  That the 
system requires repair is not debatable.  The questions which remain are how the current 
system came to be, what our expectations of the system should be, and how we ought to 
shock the political bureaucracy into action to repair the obviously ailing system. 
 Changes to this point have consistently stemmed from the conviction that failure 
was a result of poor leadership, poor individual decisions, and inexperience.  These 
“improvements” stemmed from the obvious fact that the system would work better if 
each participating organization were better equipped, better trained, and more highly 
funded.  However, while these shortcomings contribute to the inefficiencies, the 
consistent failure of the system under different personal leaderships, points to a systemic 
cause for the failure.  Criticism must look at the overall system and the environment in 
which it functions to develop a practical, appropriate, and affordable strategic plan.  The 
government must replace its tendency to fund “random acts of preparedness1” with a 
carefully outlined strategic plan that is sensitive to American political traditions, yet still 
effective. 
 People often characterize disasters and the communal response they require as a 
new phenomenon grown out of the increasingly high-tech and internationally intertwined 
 
1 Phrase borrowed from Irwin Redlener, M.D., Director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health. 
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world.  This suggestion is a myth.  The earliest recorded disasters took place before the 
Declaration of Independence.  In 1635 the Great Colonial Hurricane swept across much 
of Southern New England.  Bays were flooded killing Native Americans, trees were 
uprooted, and areas were left uninhabitable.  Governor William Bradford said of the 
storm at the time: 
…such a mighty storm of wind and rain as none living in 
these parts, either English or Indian ever saw. ...It blew 
down sundry houses and uncovered others. ...It blew down 
many hundred thousands of trees turning up the stronger by 
the roots and breaking the higher pine trees off in the 
middle.2
In other words, the scenes all too familiar from televised reports of national disasters are 
not new; they are simply more widely broadcasted.  In 1881, the Missouri River flooded.  
In 1886 Charleston, South Carolina was hit by a deadly earthquake.  In 1889, Seattle 
experienced a devastating city-wide fire.3 In 1893, six hurricanes hit the United States 
causing a total of 4,000 deaths.  In 1900, a hurricane hit Galveston, Texas leaving 
between 6,000 and 8,000 of Galveston’s 38,000 residents dead with an additional 10,000 
residents left homeless.4 This remains the most deadly weather disaster ever to hit the 
United States. 
 While economic and technological considerations encouraged people to settle 
along the Mississippi River and in other vulnerable locations increasing the scope, 
variety, and frequency of disasters, the havoc imposed by Mother Nature is not altogether 
 
2 Public Broadcasting Service, American Experience: The Hurricane of ’38, available from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/hurricane38/timeline/index.html; internet; accessed 30 January 2007. 
 3 James F. Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security: What Works, What Doesn’t (Connecticut: 
Praeger Security International, 2006), 3. 
 4 Public Broadcasting Service, American Experience: America 1900, available from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/1900/peopleevents/pande27.html; internet; accessed 30 January 2007. 
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new.  While modern disaster planning must include preparations for terrorist threats 
which pose new and previously unimaginable concerns, the overall response system 
needed to handle all disasters is similar. 
Mener - 7 - 
 - 7 -
Chapter 2: Disaster Response Pre-1979 
 Throughout the 19th century and the early 20th century, disaster response was 
handled by the federal government on a case-by-case basis without any clearly defined 
system.  The vast majority of incidents were handled by state and local authorities 
independent of federal involvement.  When federal disaster management was necessary, 
the military was the primary coordinator and source of manpower5. In 1917, during 
World War I, the federal government took its first step towards formalizing federal 
disaster relief.  The War Department issued Special Regulation Number 67 formally 
titled “Regulations Governing Flood Relief Work in the War Department”6 which despite 
its title impacted relief for all types of disasters.  However, despite the military order, 
federal disaster relief remained informal and sporadic until the 1950s.  Citizens did not 
expect the federal government to contribute to relief efforts, and most people thought of 
disaster relief as a responsibility for neighbors, faith-based organizations, and other 
charitable organizations. 
 In 1950, the onset of the Cold War prompted federal officials to absorb disaster 
response into federal civil defense.  This was accomplished by passing the Federal 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which was designed specifically to lessen the economic 
impact of disasters.  The legislative history of the bill read: 
The purpose of the bill is to provide for an orderly and 
continuing method of rendering assistance to the state and 
local governments in alleviating suffering and damage 
resulting from a major peacetime disaster and in restoring 
 
5 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 41. 
 6 Ibid. 
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public facilities and in supplementing whatever aid the state 
or local governments can render themselves.7
In many ways, the bill was a logical expansion of the New Deal social policies.  It was 
intended to provide federal money to relieve the economic stresses of a disaster but it was 
not intended to supplant current disaster relief services offered by state, local, and non-
governmental organizations.  Nonetheless, the 1950 law was the first in a series of bills 
and natural disasters that transitioned the federal government from its negligible pre-1950 
disaster relief involvement to the current system. 
 The original 1950 law was to be limited in scope, activated only upon a 
presidential disaster declaration, and designed only to supplement state and local efforts.8
However, once the federal government committed itself to an official capacity within the 
disaster relief system, the federal government became the subject of intense criticism 
every time disaster relief was less than ideal.  While initially disaster relief was the 
responsibility of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) as a result of the Cold 
War, in 1953 it was transitioned into the Department of Defense where it was juggled 
between agencies for over 25 years.9
The Department of Defense was considered the appropriate department for the 
disaster response system because of the fear that an attack from the Soviet Union could 
create the next major disaster.  However, due to limited resources, money and effort was 
expended on deterrence rather than disaster readiness.  The ongoing assumption was that 
a successful attack from the Soviet Union would be so catastrophic that even the most 
 
7 U.S. Code Cong. And Admin. Legis. Hist. for PL 81-875 (1950), 4024 as in Rutherfod H. Platt, 
Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Disasters (Washington, DC: Island Press), 17. 
 8 Platt, Disasters and Democracy, 15 
 9 Ibid. 
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prepared civil defense system would be grossly inadequate.10 Thus, the system was never 
carefully developed and was left unprepared to handle any disasters of unusually large 
magnitude – catastrophic disasters.  Routine disasters were easily handled by the states 
with financial support, and limited logistical support, from the federal government. 
 By the late 1970s several sectors of the federal government were involved in 
disaster relief.  However, since disaster relief was not the primary responsibility of any 
one agency it is unclear from the available literature exactly who had authority over the 
program.  According to former Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War 
College James F. Miskel, the General Services Administration (which builds/leases 
federal buildings), the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the 
Department of Defense all were involved in the program to various extents.11 However, 
according to Rutherford H. Platt, control of the program shifted from the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency (1951-1952), to the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1943-
1958), to the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization (1958-1962), to the Office of 
Emergency Planning (1962-1974), and then eventually to the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1974-
1979).12 
Whichever agency maintained ultimate responsibility for emergency 
management, the fact remains that federal emergency management was not a high 
priority.  Tasks were shuffled between various federal agencies, responsibilities were 
shared, and no entity had disaster response as its primary responsibility.  The deficiencies 
of this system were not immediately apparent or at least not immediately addressed since 
 
10 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 44. 
 11 Ibid., 8. 
 12 Platt, Disasters and Democracy, 15. 
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the system worked relatively well for small to moderate disasters.  In the 1970s, however, 
one catastrophic disaster and one near-catastrophic disaster forced a significant 
reevaluation of the federal disaster response system.   
Hurricane Agnes 
 In June 1972 Hurricane Agnes struck the east coast of the United States killing 
122 people and causing more than $10 billion in damage in 2005 dollars.13 It caused 
more damage in Pennsylvania than any disaster before or since.14 Time magazine even 
referred to the storm as “the most ravaging storm in U.S. history.”15 In response, the 
federal government declared seven states – Florida, Maryland, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia – disaster zones.  While Ohio and West 
Virginia simply requested and received federal reimbursements, the remaining five states 
requested federal assistance in distributing food and water to tens of thousands of people.  
Approximately, 20,000 Pennsylvania residents, 17,000 New York residents, and 10,000 
Maryland and Virginia residents had to flee their homes due to the flooding.  The relief 
efforts were characterized by mass confusion.  State and local governments were not well 
prepared to handle the disasters, and there was an overall lack of coordination between 
federal, state, local, and non-governmental organizations. 
 On June 26, the third day of the storm, the governors of New Jersey, Delaware, 
New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania met in Harrisburg to discuss the inadequacies of 
the federal relief.16 The meeting took place a day after President Nixon conducted the 
 
13 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Preparedness Site, available from 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#agnes; Internet; accessed 8 February 2007 and 
Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 59. 
 14 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 57. 
 15 “Disasters: The Violent Deadly Swath of Agnes,” Time, 3 July 1972, 9. 
 16 Paul L. Montgomery, “Flood Areas Rally as Waters Recede,” The New York Times, 26 June 1972, p. 
1A. 
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traditional flyover of a disaster site.  As a result of this highly public summit and the 
political pressures it applied, on June 26, President Nixon directed all federal agencies to 
“provide all Federal assistance needed, and do it immediately by cutting through red 
tape.”17 On June 27, he further directed Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to conduct a tour 
of the disaster stricken regions to “make sure Federal officials are cooperating fully.”18 
The vice president discovered that federal disaster relief to people who had lost 
their homes in the storm was not adequate.19 On July 4, ten days after the storm made 
landfall, disaster victims were still waiting in line at the Red Cross for temporary 
housing.  The flow of information was inadequate and local governments were given 
conflicting information about which expenses would be reimbursed by the federal 
government.20 While media coverage in the 1970s was generally more passive and less 
provocative than today’s round-the-clock anxiety provoking reports, the storm, 
nonetheless, received extensive coverage given the other concurrent world events such as 
the Vietnam War and its anti-war protests.  Despite media attention, however, thousands 
of disaster victims were still living in federal trailers one year later.  The disaster response 
system simply failed on all accounts. 
 Due to the concerns raised by the response to Hurricane Agnes, the National 
Governors Association, a bipartisan organization of state governors, set up a commission 
to analyze the state and federal response system.  The commission issued a policy 
statement recommending a consolidation of federal emergency preparedness 
responsibilities into one agency.  One year later, the commission published an academic 
 
17 “Washington: For the Record,” The Washington Post, 26 June 1972, 16. 
 18 Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, interview by Michal Knight, “Nixon Asks $100 Million in Flood 
Relief,” The New York Times, 28 June 1972, 28. 
 19 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 60. 
 20 Ibid., 61. 
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study with the same recommendations.  This study also concluded, although in somewhat 
kinder terms, that states were not prepared to adequately handle their disaster response 
responsibilities.21 
Three Mile Island 
 Although the federal government had begun to evaluate its disaster preparedness 
no major changes were made before the next major activation of the ailing disaster 
response system seven years later.  In March of 1979, a nuclear accident titled “the most 
serious22” accident since the inception of the American commercial nuclear power 
industry took place at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  One of the two nuclear reactors in the electrical plant underwent a partial 
core meltdown.  Although there were no serious injuries or deaths directly linked to the 
Three Mile Island accident, the magnitude of the incident has had a long lasting effect on 
nuclear regulations in the United States.  The near disaster sparked public apprehensions 
about the safety of nuclear technology that persist to this day.  While the Three Mile 
Island incident was caused by a nuclear accident rather than a natural disaster, the event 
nonetheless, caused widespread destruction that displaced thousands of people from their 
damaged homes and reeked havoc on public infrastructure.  Thus, it required the 
activation of the same disaster response system that was proven inadequate during 
Hurricane Agnes. 
 The response to the Three Mile Island incident raised so many serious questions 
that President Richard Nixon immediately established a high level commission to 
 
21 Ibid., 67. 
 22 Title given by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
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examine the causes of, preparedness for, and response to the incident.  Six months later in 
October 1979 the commission issued its official report which stated: 
The response to the emergency was dominated by an 
atmosphere of almost total confusion.  There was a lack of 
communication at all levels.  Many key recommendations 
were made by individuals who were not in possession of 
accurate information and those who managed the accident 
were slow to realize the significance and implications of 
the events that had taken place.23 
It is no mystery why the response to the disaster was inadequate.  In a report issued by 
the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) following the accident, it 
was noted that Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Radiation Protection which was responsible for 
developing emergency plans for nuclear facilities and the surrounding areas failed to 
prepare adequate plans.  The bureau submitted a draft plan to the federal Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission in 1975 but the plan was rejected and returned to the bureau for 
modification.  Although the plan was revised, four years later when the nuclear accident 
occurred, it was still never resubmitted for final approval by the federal government.24 
Although nobody will ever know if the revised plan would have received federal 
approval, in retrospect the plan was obviously still inadequate. 
 It is important to realize that the blame for inadequate preparedness is shared 
between the state, local, and federal government.  While the state Bureau of Radiation 
Protection failed to maintain an adequate and approved plan, the federal Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission is the agency responsible for overall emergency disaster 
 
23 President’s Commission, Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island,
39;  quoted in Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 63-64. 
 24 Oran K. Henderson, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Preparedness and Response: The 
Three Mile Island Incident. ed. Thomas H. Moss and David L. Sills, Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: 
Lessons and Implication (New York: New York Academy of Science, 1981), 317-318; referenced in 
Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 64. 
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planning for nuclear power facilities.  Despite this oversight responsibility, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission licensed the Three Mile Island power plant without certifying a 
state evacuation plan.  Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission failed to 
maintain any federal response plan and failed to notice that county and local governments 
did not maintain adequate evacuation plans.  Evacuation plans only existed for the 
citizens in the immediate five-mile radius of the nuclear facility.  However, in the hours 
following the disaster, officials contemplated evacuating people as far as 20 miles from 
the facility.  Furthermore, there was no system in place to communicate emergency 
information to people in the surrounding communities or to the media.25 
News reports reflected this communications gap and were marked by utter 
confusion and misinformation.  Most significantly, there was tremendous confusion about 
the actual severity of the situation in the nuclear facility, and this confusion was not 
confined to the press.  On March 30 two conflicting evacuation recommendations were 
issued to the governor of Pennsylvania.  The state Bureau of Radiation Protection 
claimed that radiation levels in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility were so low 
that an evacuation of surrounding neighborhoods was not needed.  However, on the very 
same day the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an evacuation advisory 
recommending that pregnant women and children be evacuated. 
 The media coverage of the Three Mile Island event was much more anxiety 
provoking than that of previous natural disasters.  In the past, media reports were 
confined to publicizing facts about current and past events such as the number of people 
displaced, the number of homes destroyed, and the wind strength, as example.  In this 
case, media reports raised fear of the unknown and often made sensationalist conjectures 
 
25 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 64. 
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about the worst possible scenario.  Walter Cronkite, the CBS Evening News anchor said 
on March 30, 1979: 
The world has never known a day quite like today.  It faced 
the considerable uncertainties and dangers of the worst 
nuclear power plant accident of the atomic age.  And the 
horror tonight is that it could get much worse.  It is not an 
atomic explosion that is feared; experts say that is 
impossible.  But the spector was raised [of] perhaps the 
next most serious kind of nuclear catastrophe, a massive 
release of radioactivity … the potential is there for the 
ultimate risk of a meltdown at the Three Mile Island 
Atomic Power Plant.26 
The unknown factor in Cronkite’s broadcast and other similar reports sparked a 
widespread public outcry for better emergency preparedness.  Although the Three Mile 
Island accident passed without any deaths, the scare led President Jimmy Carter to 
establish another President’s Commission, similar to the Nixon commission that followed 
Hurricane Agnes, to evaluate the response and make recommendations.  Before the 
commission even completed its report, however, the federal government hastened the 
establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency which was recommended 
following Hurricane Agnes.27 
26 David M. Rubin, “What the President’s Commission Learned About the Media,” ed. Thomas H. Moss 
and David L. Sills, Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident: Lessons and Implication (New York: New York 
Academy of Science, 1981), 98-99; quoted in Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 66. 
 27 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 67. 
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Chapter 3: The Establishment of FEMA 
 In 1979, in the wake of Hurricane Agnes and the Three Mile High nuclear 
accident, Congress and President Carter through a combination of legislation and an 
executive order established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
the Emergency Management Council.  In theory, the creation of FEMA consolidated the 
disaster preparedness responsibilities performed by various federal agencies into one 
agency, thereby alleviating the fragmentation and communications difficulties identified 
in the 1970s.   
 The executive order required that all federal agencies with disaster response 
capabilities and responsibilities cooperate with FEMA and tasked FEMA with 
coordinating preparedness as well as relief operations.  While the reorganization 
requested cooperation from all federal agencies with emergency response capabilities, the 
system did not subordinate them to FEMA.  The hope was that the newly created 
Emergency Management Council, which was chaired by the FEMA Director and 
included all federal agencies with disaster preparedness responsibilities, would enhance 
FEMA’s stature within the federal bureaucracy and give the new agency the clout 
necessary to effectively coordinate disaster preparedness and response.28 
Upon close examination, however, it is obvious that the creation of FEMA really 
only promised to affect disaster preparedness and held little hope of improving disaster 
response.  Most major elements of disaster response were left untouched during the 
reorganization.  Small programs involved in the actual response to disasters such as the 
Federal Insurance Administration and the National Fire Prevention and Control 
 
28 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 68-69. 
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Administration, previously located with the Department of Commerce and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, respectively, were consolidated into 
FEMA.  Beyond these minor consolidations, however, most changes were confined to 
preparedness and had little effect on actual response capabilities.  Executive Order 12148, 
which was responsible for the consolidation of federal resources, only brought together 
three agencies - The Federal Preparedness Agency, The Defense Civil Preparedness 
Agency, and The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, all of which were largely 
responsible for providing grants and policy guidance to states. 
 Executive Order 12148 actually included specific provisions that preserved the 
federal government’s dispersion of federal response capabilities amongst many 
organizations.  Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of Executive Order 12148 stated: 
2-201. In executing the functions under this Order, the 
Director shall develop policies which provide that all civil 
defense and civil emergency functions, resources, and 
systems of Executive agencies are: 
 a)founded on the use of existing organizations, 
resources, and systems to the maximum extent 
practicable… 
2-202. Assignments of civil emergency functions shall, 
whenever possible, be based on extensions (under 
emergency conditions) of the regular missions of the 
Executive agencies.29 
In other words, upon close examination it appears that the establishment of FEMA was 
little more than an attempt to raise the profile of emergency preparedness and response 
within the federal bureaucracy by giving it its own agency. While preparedness functions 
may have been consolidated, actual emergency response functions were to remain 
virtually untouched.  The only true change was the establishment of a single agency 
 
29 Ibid., 70 
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charged with the coordination of response efforts and the establishment of the Emergency 
Management Council to assist in these coordination efforts.30 
Despite what was publicized as a major reorganization of disaster response in the 
United States, the establishment of FEMA as the lead federal disaster preparedness and 
relief agency in 1979 did not overhaul the way disasters are handled in the United States.  
Although the establishment of FEMA involved some agency consolidation to facilitate 
the overall coordination of federal disaster relief and preparedness efforts, the truth is that 
federal resources remain dispersed amongst many agencies and the overall role of the 
federal government as a secondary resource remained unchanged.  In fact, activation of 
federal resources both before and after the creation of FEMA has required states to 
request federal aid and has required federal certification that state and local governments 
are in fact overwhelmed.   
 Most years over 100 serious weather related incidents strike the United States, 
and states request federal assistance only in about half of those cases.  The federal 
government typically certifies between 45 and 50 disasters annually, and in most of these 
cases federal assistance is confined to post-facto reimbursements to state and local 
authorities for expenses.31 This system of distribution which puts the primary burden of 
emergency response on the state and local governments has been in existence ever since 
the War Department oversaw disaster response during World War I, and it is consistent 
with the American federalist system of government.  The creation of FEMA was not 
intended to change this dynamic.  Federal resources, monetary as well as logistical, then 
 
30 Ibid., 68-70. 
 31 Ibid., 2. 
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and now are supposed to supplement but not substitute local resources.32 The truth is that 
for the vast majority of disasters, this system of local responsibility which partners 
private sector organizations, state and local governments, and the federal government 
works quite well.     
 Large private sector organizations such as the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and 
private corporations, as well as small organizations such as local faith-based institutions 
and individuals, typically handle a large portion of emergency response during disasters.  
The Red Cross and Salvation Army, for example, consistently provide food and 
temporary housing amongst other resources.  At the same time, state and local 
governments remain the primary source of manpower and coordination during disaster 
operations.  They oversee police departments, fire departments, and ambulance services.  
Additionally, states have the ability to call up the National Guard if more manpower is 
needed.  As a last resort and designed only to be used when state and local resources are 
overwhelmed, the states can request assistance from the federal government.  The vast 
majority of the time the federal government’s role is confined to post-facto 
reimbursements to state and local governments.  However, on rare occasions the federal 
government has taken on coordination responsibilities and deployed federal troops to 
disaster regions.33 
In evaluating the effectiveness of the disaster system, it is critical to understand 
the secondary or even tertiary role of federal government in the response plan.  When a 
disaster strikes a particular area, local authorities are the primary responders.  While 
federal and state agencies are involved in training local responders and assuring adequate 
 
32 Ibid., 8. 
 33 Saundra K. Schneider, Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 28. 
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preparation, the system does not immediately involve them in the actual response efforts.  
The system assumes that most disasters can be handled entirely by local authorities.34 
When local authorities are overwhelmed, municipalities can turn to neighboring 
districts and request assistance through mutual aid agreements.  States help coordinate 
these efforts and, in the event that these resources are overwhelmed, states may offer their 
own resources such as monetary assistance, supplies, state police, or even the National 
Guard.  The details of each state’s emergency response plan vary from state to state.   
Some people claim this is necessary since each state’s plan must be designed to confront 
the unique needs and logistics of that state.  For example, some states are prone to 
tornados while others commonly experience earthquakes, floods, or forest fires.35 Other 
people, including the federal government, argue that one all-hazards approach to 
emergency response is ideal since all rescue operations require the same basic skills and 
equipment.  To provide some consistency, while the details of each state’s emergency 
preparedness and response plans vary, the overall structure is regulated by the federal 
government.36 Each state must designate one agency as the lead emergency preparedness 
agency.  It must serve as the central coordinating authority for all state-level actions as 
well as the point of contact for local and federal authorities. 
 When state and local resources are completely overwhelmed, a state governor can 
request federal assistance but must do so by explicitly claiming that local and state 
resources are overwhelmed.  The request must be reviewed by FEMA and certified by the 
president.  According to federal law, the president must agree that the disaster has 
 
34 Ibid., 29. 
 35 Ibid., 30. 
 36 Note: States may chose to ignore the federal structure but in doing so they lose their eligibility for 
federal financial assistance. 
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exceeded state and local capabilities before the federal government can become directly 
involved in relief efforts.  If and when the president certifies the disaster, FEMA becomes 
involved and appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer to oversee the federal response.37 
FEMA maintains a very small staff, however, and only acts as a direct resource 
for a few types of relief.  For example, FEMA is able to allocate temporary housing such 
as tents and mobile homes.  The agency can distribute cash grants to disaster victims and 
has some limited abilities to actually get federal aid supplies to disaster regions.  
However, FEMA does not maintain its own fleet of trucks, planes, or railroad cars.  
Rather, the agency must rely on cooperation from 29 different federal agencies and 
departments.  The Federal Coordinating Officer is designated as a representative of the 
president to provide him with enough clout within the federal bureaucracy to encourage 
interagency cooperation.38 The Federal Coordinating Officer is tasked with securing 
these federal resources, coordinating cooperation between the various federal agencies, 
and then coordinating the overall federal response with the state and local governments.   
 While this structure may seem excessively bureaucratic and the responsibility 
may seem widely distributed, the system was designed to avoid excessive replication of 
resources.  When the system fails, people often criticize the current presidential 
administration for creating an unnecessarily large bureaucratic system.  It is important to 
realize that the system is carefully legislated in The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-
288) and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 
(PL 100-707), and the system is implemented through the National Response Plan; it is 
not a bureaucratic system created by the president.  In fact, even if the president wants to 
 
37 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster, 31. 
 38 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 9, 11. 
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provide federal disaster relief to the states without receiving a formal request, federal law 
protects the states jurisdiction.39 
39 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster, 31. 
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Chapter 4: FEMA - An Imperfect System 
 Although the federal relief system was reorganized under the auspices of FEMA, 
the program failures identified by Hurricane Agnes and the Three Mile High nuclear 
accident were not corrected.  Both prior to and subsequent to the creation of FEMA, the 
American disaster relief program adequately handled the most common disasters.  During 
the nine years following the establishment of FEMA the federal government certified 
about 20 disasters annually.  Of those, Hurricanes Alicia, Gloria, Elena, and Juan all 
required substantial federal involvement, caused about a billion dollars in damage each, 
and were marked by adequate recovery efforts.  However, when the system was stressed 
by disasters of unusually large proportions (catastrophic disasters), FEMA neither 
noticeably reduced fragmentation nor sufficiently improved communication between 
various emergency response organizations.  In fact, over time FEMA proved to be a 
minimal improvement to the previous system. 
Hurricane Hugo 
 In 1989 the continued inadequacy of the federal disaster response system was 
proven when Hurricane Hugo made landfall.  It was the first Category 4 hurricane to hit 
the United States since ten years before the establishment of FEMA, and it was the 
strongest hurricane to strike the Carolinas in over 30 years.  With winds reaching 135 
miles per hour it whipped through the U.S. Virgin Islands across to Charleston and up 
into North Carolina.  According to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration the storm caused approximately $14 billion in damages in 2002 dollars.40 
40 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 78. 
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Since the storm was predicted by the National Weather Service, FEMA officials 
pre-deployed to the Carolinas in anticipation of a disaster declaration request by the 
governors.  On September 29, a day and a half before the storm struck Charleston, the 
governor of South Carolina issued an evacuation order for coastal and low-lying 
communities.  As soon as the South Carolina governor issued the formal request for 
federal assistance, the president certified the disaster, and FEMA officials began to 
deploy federal resources.  Two days later the governor of North Carolina issued a similar 
request for federal assistance, and that request was also immediately certified by the 
president.41 
The declaration and certification process proceeded smoothly.  However, the 
distribution of relief supplies in South Carolina was problematic and demonstrated an 
overall lack of coordination between state and federal officials.  For example, FEMA did 
not ship enough generators to the region.  The state government blamed FEMA for this 
error while FEMA claimed that the state only requested a small number of generators.  
The perception of an inadequately sluggish federal response was exasperated by 
President George H. W. Bush’s decision to put off a presidential tour of the region until 
eight days after the storm.  In reality, it is not entirely relevant whether the disaster 
response was inadequate because the states failed to make timely requests or because the 
federal government failed to deliver on those requests.  Ultimately, all that really matters 
is that four days after the storm Charleston, South Carolina was still without electricity, a 
third of Florence, South Carolina was without power, and half of Charlotte, North 
 
41 Ibid., 78-79. 
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Carolina was in the dark.  Furthermore, a substantial percentage of the population did not 
have food, water, or temporary housing.42 
The reason for the delay in the delivery of essential aid was likely twofold.  First, 
there were significant communications problems on the state and local levels since many 
of the emergency communication systems were compromised by the storm.  These 
technical difficulties likely affected the delivery of federal aid as well as the restoration of 
electrical services by private contractors since coordination with state and local officials 
was complicated.  Second, the particular structure of the South Carolina emergency 
management agency was less than ideal.  The director was independently elected rather 
than appointed by the governor, and there was inadequate communication between the 
governor’s and the director’s offices.  In fact, some reports indicate that the governor and 
the head of the emergency management agency maintained two separate operations 
centers during the storm and that there was limited or no communication between their 
offices resulting in unanswered requests for assistance and coordination from local and 
federal authorities.43 
Some government reports, including a 1991 oral testimony report released by the 
federal government’s General Accounting Office blamed the ‘near simultaneity’ of 
Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, a major earthquake that affected the 
San Francisco region.44 However, Hurricane Hugo made landfall in South Carolina on 
September 22, 1989, and the earthquake did not strike until October 17, 1989.  Even if 
the earthquake had an adverse effect on relief efforts in South Carolina, this does not 
 
42 Ibid., 80. 
 43 Ibid., 80-81 
 44 Oral Testimony by John M. Ols, Jr. - “Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and Local Responses to 
Natural Disasters Need Improvement,” 15 May 1991 (GAO/T-RCED-91-39) 
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explain the inadequacy of federal relief in the almost four weeks prior to the earthquake.  
Furthermore, the American disaster relief system must be capable of handling multiple 
simultaneous and large-scale disasters.  In the interest of appropriately distributing 
criticism, it is worth noting that the earthquake resulted in considerably less criticism of 
the federal government.  That was likely due to lower public expectations since the 
hurricane was predicted and the earthquake was not.  It was also largely due to a much 
better organized, more experienced, and better funded state emergency management 
agency in California rather than to a better federal response.   
 The same 1991 report released by the General Accounting Office that blamed the 
near simultaneity of the disasters for the lacking federal response also noted the need to 
improve the three major areas of disaster management – preparedness, immediate 
response, and recovery.  In the area of preparedness the report notes that states and local 
governments have the primary responsibility; FEMA only has the ability to “guide, not 
direct” state and local governments regarding their preparedness.  Furthermore, the report 
notes that if states or local governments choose to ignore federal advice, not remedy 
problems identified during joint training exercises, or not participate in training exercises, 
“FEMA has no practical means of requiring that they do so…”45 
The report essentially blames the state governments for the inadequate disaster 
relief.  It highlights the contrast between the success of the relief efforts in California, 
which maintained a well-funded and well-trained emergency response system, and the 
Virgin Islands which did not develop adequate state emergency plans and did not 
appropriately seek federal advice or use federal training resources.  While the report 
claimed that FEMA fulfilled its primary responsibilities, it also agreed that significant 
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staffing and coordination problems compromised efficiency.  The main conclusions and 
recommendations in the report highlighted the need to educate government officials to 
better understand FEMA’s role as a secondary resource and to ask Congress to provide 
FEMA with the resources to secure permanent housing for disaster victims when 
necessary.  Lastly, in responding to the criticism that the federal government did not 
adequately provide immediate response to the hurricane, the report notes, “FEMA is not 
authorized to assume the state’s role as immediate responder.”  For this reason the report 
suggests to Congress, “Legislative action may be needed to give FEMA such authority if 
it is to act as an immediate responder in the future, when warranted and requested by the 
state.”46 
Hurricane Andrew 
 In the years following Hurricane Hugo, the federal government developed the 
National Response Plan.  This plan was designed to supplement state and local disaster 
response efforts through a 1992 signed agreement between 27 federal departments and 
agencies.  This agreement represented an unprecedented effort to unify all domestic 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities into a unified emergency plan 
to assure optimal preparedness and careful coordination.47 The plan was tested for the 
first time three years later when Hurricane Andrew struck Florida.  Hurricane Andrew, a 
Category 4 storm, was the third largest storm to ever hit the United States.  It caused 
between $35 and $40 billion in damages, almost two and half times as much damage as 
Hurricane Hugo.  Hurricane Andrew completely destroyed 28,000 homes, seriously 
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 47 U.S. General Services Administration, available from  
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentType=GSA_BASIC&contentId=17463&noc=T;
Internet; accessed 21 February 2007. 
Mener - 28 - 
 - 28 -
damaged 100,000 homes, left between 180,000 and 250,000 people homeless, damaged 
80,000 local businesses, killed 61 people, knocked out electricity to 1.5 million people, 
and disrupted phone service to 150,000 people.48 
Just as FEMA had done before Hurricane Hugo, FEMA deployed a small 
taskforce to the region before the storm in anticipation of a disaster assistance request 
from the Florida governor.  Within eight hours of the storm making landfall, the governor 
made his request and the president quickly certified it.  The system failures began shortly 
thereafter.  The major failure was that nobody at the local, state, or federal level 
understood the severity of the damage.  According to Larry Zensinger, FEMA’s Program 
Coordinator, Florida officials incorrectly believed they could manage the disaster.49 
While local officials obviously saw the damage in their communities, it took time for 
them to quantify the damage, and the lack of phone service made it difficult for them to 
communicate their needs to state and federal officials since wireless communication 
technology was still rudimentary and not available in many locations.  This made the 
compilation of a comprehensive damage assessment extremely difficult.50 
FEMA was widely blamed for the failure to rapidly assess the extent of the 
damage and for failing to deploy essential relief.  Two days after the storm made landfall 
people were still stranded without food, water, shelter, and other basic necessities.  Kate 
Hale, the Emergency Management Director for Dade County, Florida made a series of 
scathing remarks at a press conference criticizing the inadequacy of the federal response.  
Several days later Congresswoman Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) in a letter to the 
Comptroller General of the United States wrote:  
 
48 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 81. 
 49 Schneider, Flirting with Disaster, 93. 
 50 Miskel, Disaster Response and Homeland Security, 82-83. 
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I am outraged by the federal government’s pathetically 
sluggish and ill-planned response to the devastating disaster 
wrought by Hurricane Andrew…Time and again the 
federal government has failed to respond quickly and 
effectively to major disasters.51 
While Director Hale’s and Congresswoman Mikulsi’s criticisms of the overall pace and 
quality of the disaster relief may be correct, it is not clear that FEMA was solely to 
blame.  The tasks of assessing damages, coordinating the delivery of local aid, and 
requesting aid from the federal government is the responsibility of the state government 
and not the federal government.  To blame only FEMA for inadequacies in this area is 
simply not appropriate although FEMA does deserve some blame for not circumventing 
standard operating procedures to save lives and relieve human suffering.  Nonetheless, 
since most citizens do not understand the distribution of responsibility and incorrectly 
assume that the federal government oversees state government operations, the political 
ramifications of the federal government blaming the state government were too high.   
 With no choice but to escalate the federal response to defray criticism of the 
federal government, President H. W. Bush sent Andrew Card, the Secretary of 
Transportation, to take control of the federal response.  While in theory the Federal 
Coordinating Officer, who had already been on scene for three days, is a representative of 
the president, a higher level official with more interdepartmental and interagency clout 
was needed to quickly overcome the bureaucratic and administrative obstacles to making 
federal aid flow expeditiously.  The 26 federal departments and 13 functional groups 
which made up the Federal Response Plan were not prepared to work together and were 
not primed for their tasks.  Thus, Andrew Card delegated many disaster response tasks to 
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the Department of Defense, which is the only government agency with the manpower and 
equipment to rapidly escalate federal involvement and coordination efforts. 
 The General Accounting Office’s (GAO) July 1993 Report to Congressional 
Requesters highlights the inadequacies the overall response to catastrophic disasters such 
as Hurricane Andrew.  While the report strongly criticizes the federal government for an 
inadequate relief effort, the report also highlights the need to completely redesign the 
disaster response plan and its distribution of responsibilities during catastrophic disasters.  
The report states, “Unlike the bulk of the disasters requiring FEMA to respond, however, 
catastrophic disasters overwhelm the ability of state, local and voluntary agencies to 
adequately provide victims with essential services, such as food and water, within 12 to 
24 hours.”  The report goes on to say: 
The federal strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters 
is deficient because it lacks provisions for the federal 
government to immediately (1) assess in a comprehensive 
manner the damage and the corresponding needs of disaster 
victims and (2) provide food, shelter, and other essential 
services when the needs of disaster victims outstrip the 
resources of the state, local, and private voluntary 
community.”52 
The GAO highlights that the plan itself, which relies on state and local resources for most 
needs assessment and relief delivery, and not the implementation of the plan by the 
federal government overall, or FEMA in specific, is the primary source of the 
inadequacy.  The report, furthermore, criticizes federal law for not authorizing federal 
preparatory activities when the threat of a disaster is imminent and for not authorizing 
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FEMA to reimburse other agencies for expenditures prior to the official federal disaster 
declaration.53 
While this approach may seemingly exonerate FEMA and the executive branch 
from direct responsibility for the failures since Congress is the architect of the plan and 
the law, the report also includes scathing criticism of FEMA for its management of its 
limited responsibilities.  The GAO report states, “FEMA has neither established 
performance standards nor developed a training exercise program specifically geared 
toward enhancing state and local preparedness for catastrophic disaster response.”54 
Without such standards and without appropriate training for state and local responders, 
the federal disaster response plan is essentially relying on blind faith that state, local, and 
voluntary resources will be adequately prepared to orchestrate rescue efforts, deliver the 
food and supplies being paid for with federal dollars, and coordinate efficiently with the 
federal government.  These assumptions were proven to be incorrect during Hurricane 
Andrew, Three Mile Island, Hurricane Hugo, and Hurricane Andrew. 
 After criticizing the response to Hurricane Andrew, the GAO made several 
specific recommendations.  The GAO recommended that the president appoint a senior 
administration official with oversight authority over FEMA and other federal agencies to 
oversee disaster response planning and administration.  The office recommended that 
FEMA create a disaster response unit charged with assessing the amount, type and 
projected cost of federal disaster assistance needed and make that recommendation to the 
state governor.  The office also recommended improving FEMA’s coordination efforts 
during catastrophic disasters and enhancing state and local preparedness to respond to 
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disasters.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the GAO recommended that Congress 
give FEMA the explicit authority to preposition and prepare for catastrophic disasters 
when there is a warning.  The office also recommended that Congress lift the restrictions 
on the Department of Defense’s ability to use Reserve units for catastrophic disaster 
relief efforts.55 
The strength of the criticisms outlined by the General Accounting Office and the 
frightening consequences of inaction should have created a forum for lively discussion 
and swift governmental action to improve disaster readiness.  While the inadequacy of 
disaster response became a prominent issue in the 1992 presidential election and may 
have even contributed to President Bush’s electoral defeat, no effective action was taken 
to improve the system.  Instead of reforming the disaster response system, President 
Clinton chose to rely on increased direct presidential involvement and a new FEMA staff 
to assure improved disaster preparedness.  Rather than pushing for legislative reforms, 
the Executive Branch consulted with Congress and reinterpreted the Disaster Relief Act 
to allow some pre-disaster preparedness expenditures.  However, these changes did 
nothing to offset the federal reliance on state, local, and private resources, nothing to 
assure rapid insurance claim processing, and nothing to improve the distribution of food 
and shelter to disaster victims.56 In short, the federal leadership changed but the system 
remained virtually the same.  The pattern of making minor administrative and structural 
changes rather than revamping the entire disaster response system repeated itself once 
again.  Although the federal government deserves credit for adequately handling the 
Loma Prieta and North Ridge Earthquakes in the 1990s as well as the Midwest floods, 
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none of these disasters were truly catastrophic in size or strength.  The next catastrophic 
disaster was more than 10 years away and politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens had 
plenty of time to become complacent about the need for disaster response reforms. 
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Chapter 5: 9/11 and the Establishment of the  
Department of Homeland Security 
 
September 11, 2001 is commonly thought of as the next major disaster in the 
United States.  Readers should be cautioned, however, that while thousands of people 
died in the terrorist attacks they did not resemble the catastrophic disasters previously 
discussed.  Unlike all of the natural disasters previously detailed, the attacks in New York 
City and Washington, DC did not completely overwhelm the emergency response 
capabilities of entire regions.  The attacks caused brief mass confusion and overwhelmed 
individual emergency response agencies but did not paralyze the entire emergency 
response network.  The primary first responders were the Fire Department of New York 
(FDNY), the New York Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police 
Department (PAPD), and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM).57 
While federal officials participated in rescue operations and helped provide security after 
the attacks, the immediate rescue efforts were orchestrated by local responders.   
 The local response networks were overwhelmed and resources were strained, but 
there was no system-wide breakdown in organization or authority.  Nonetheless, 
emergency responders encountered many of the same problems that responders 
experience during catastrophic disasters.  Communication systems failed, 911 call centers 
were overwhelmed, trained personnel were in short supply, interagency communication 
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was lacking or absent altogether, response plans were often ignored and widely thought 
to be inadequate, and interagency chains of command were often ambiguous.58 
Despite these similarities, one cannot overlook the many important differences.  
The attacks were more localized than most catastrophic disasters, did not overwhelm 
emergency shelters or food distribution centers, and did not destroy the city infrastructure 
in either New York or Washington.  For this reason, 9/11 cannot be considered a truly 
catastrophic disaster and, thus, a detailed analysis of the 9/11 attacks is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  However, the 9/11 experience highlights one critical concept.  One cannot 
ignore the importance of maintaining highly trained local emergency responders as well 
as properly staffed and equipped local emergency response agencies; local first 
responders are on scene first, handle the vast majority of rescue operations, and cannot be 
practically replaced by federal responders, especially when disasters strike without 
warning. 
 Unfortunately, the differences between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and most 
disasters were not adequately recognized by the federal government in the months 
following the attacks.  Rather than carefully analyzing government failures, Congress and 
the President succumbed to the “do something” calls from the general public and created 
the Department of Homeland Security in November 2002 without taking the time to 
carefully contemplate how the new department would achieve its objectives.  Just before 
signing H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, President Bush said: 
The new department will analyze threats, will guard our 
borders and airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and 
coordinate the response of our nation for future 
emergencies. The Department of Homeland Security will 
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focus the full resources of the American government on the 
safety of the American people.59 
This bill lumped 170,000 employees from 22 different federal agencies, including 
FEMA, into one agency with a cabinet level Secretary of Homeland Security.60 The 
theory was that unifying these agencies under one high-level supervisor would facilitate 
interagency cooperation and improve overall national security.  However, this major 
administrative change, often dubbed the largest federal government restructuring since 
the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947, was highly flawed.   
 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the overall successes and 
failures of the Department of Homeland Security, a brief analysis of the reorganization is 
necessary to understand the effect this change had on disaster response.  The widespread 
restructuring took place without co-locating the 22 departments; this made it difficult to 
overcome the individual agency cultures that were widely blamed for the lack of 
coordination amongst and communication between the various agencies.  Furthermore, 
the reorganization took place without restructuring government oversight of the 
individual agencies.  Therefore, according to Norman J. Orstein, a scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, 13 House and Senate Committees and approximately 60 
subcommittees exercise some authority over the department.61 
Simply handling this oversight coordination, managing threat analysis, 
coordinating with foreign agencies, and managing intelligence information is an 
overwhelming task for senior administrators.  According to Donald F. Kettl, Director of 
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the Fel’s School of Government at the University of Pennsylvania, “Most of the 
department’s senior officials are so buried under the pressing day-to-day operational 
issues that they have little energy and less time to devote to resolving the department’s 
considerable management issues, which means that the issues are not resolved.”62 Senior 
administrators are forced to focus on what is perceived as the immediate crises, thereby 
neglecting many responsibilities that have been incorporated into the department and 
ignoring the overall purpose of the restructuring which was to improve cooperation 
between agencies. 
 As a policy, the federal government promotes “all-hazard” preparation on the 
theory that all disasters, whether terror-related or natural, require similar disaster 
preparedness and response.  While this is often true, terrorist attacks and natural disasters 
also pose unique challenges.  Since the Department of Homeland Security was created, 
the federal government has focused on responding to and preventing terrorist attacks.  
Law enforcement personnel, for example, have been more involved in federal 
preparations than fire personnel.  Alan Caldwell of the International Fire Chiefs 
Association said, “We’re the last to be consulted.  Yet, in an incident, we’ll be the first to 
respond.”63 Former FEMA Director James Lee Witt opposed including FEMA in the 
new Department of Homeland Security because of his concern that the federal all-hazards 
approach would be marginalized so as to emphasize responding to and preventing 
terrorism.64 
While the Department of Homeland Security refers to its National Response Plan 
as a “single all-discipline, all hazards plan,” many government grant processes for 
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terrorist response and prevention are maintained separately – some by FEMA, some by 
the new Directorate for Emergency Preparedness, and others by the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness.  The disjointed nature of the grant process is symbolic of the overall lack 
of coordination that pervades the new Department of Homeland Security despite its 
creation to improve coordination.  Whereas FEMA had a cabinet-level post in the 1990s, 
the new department subordinated FEMA to the Undersecretary for Emergency 
Preparedness and Response who reports to the Secretary of the Department, a member of 
the president’s cabinet.  The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, 
just like the creation of FEMA in 1979, can be seen as a futile effort to improve 
interagency communication and coordination.  The tragedy of this new highly 
bureaucratic system was seen firsthand when Hurricane Katrina struck the coast of the 
United States in 2005. 
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Chapter 6: New Orleans – A Recent Case Study 
 On August 25, 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck the Florida coast but caused 
minimal damage.  Every major weather reporting agency, however, predicted that the 
storm would gain strength in the Gulf of Mexico and strike the New Orleans region with 
incredible power.  Authorities differed over exactly how strong the storm would be when 
it made landfall and whether the storm would be a direct or indirect hit.  In either case the 
destruction would be severe.  However, the worst case scenario, a direct hit by a Category 
5 storm would be catastrophic and devastating.  New Orleans is not just any densely 
populated city.  The city is built below sea level and relies on a complex network of 
levies and pumps to prevent the city from becoming totally submerged.  New Orleans is 
surrounded by Lake Borgne to the east, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, and the 
Mississippi River to the south. 
 The threat faced by New Orleans in August 2005, however, was not 
unanticipated.  New Orleans had a long history of devastating hurricanes.  Its past history 
includes the 1909 Grand Isle Hurricane, the 1915 New Orleans Hurricane, the 1947 Fort 
Lauderdale Hurricane, the 1956 Hurricane Flossy, and the 1965 Hurricane Betsy, just to 
name a few.  Hurricane Betsy was the most devastating.  One of the city levees was 
compromised by the storm leading to severe flooding of the Lower 9th Ward.  This storm 
served as a wakeup call that New Orleans was at incredible risk from natural disasters.  
By the end of the hurricane, approximately 75 people were killed in Louisiana.  Congress 
authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to build a levee system capable of withstanding 
the most severe weather disasters.  However, 40 years later, when Hurricane Katrina 
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struck New Orleans, the project had not been completed.  Most authorities estimated that 
the pre-Katrina levee system would struggle to withstand even a Category 3 hurricane. 
 The threat to New Orleans was not forgotten over the years.  In 1985, Hurricane 
Juan led to a large evacuation of the city although major damage was avoided.  Although 
Hurricane Andrew did not strike New Orleans, for a short time authorities feared a direct 
hit.  In 1998, Hurricane Georges prompted a widespread evacuation of the city although 
once again widespread devastation was avoided.  Similarly, Hurricane Ivan prompted a 
widespread evacuation of the city but significant damage was avoided.  By 2005, 
approximately 40 years had passed since the last hurricane caused major destruction in 
New Orleans.  Marc Levitan, the director of Louisiana State University’s hurricane center 
commented to the Houston Chronicle, “To some extent, I think we’ve been lulled to 
sleep.”65 The potential threat was clear but people had become irrationally complacent, 
relying heavily on the hope that their luck would continue. 
 Despite the complacency, however, FEMA consistently ranked hurricane damage 
to New Orleans amongst the three most likely catastrophic disasters to affect the United 
States.  For that reason, in July 2004 FEMA staged Hurricane Pam, a five-day mock 
storm scenario with winds of 120 MPH and 20 inches of rain.  The exercises involved 
officials from federal, state, local, and voluntary organizations and took place at the State 
Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  According to the scenario, 
more than one million residents were evacuated from New Orleans and between 500,000 
and 600,000 buildings were destroyed as water flowed over the levees.66 In the 
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debriefings following this mock hurricane, officials told The Times-Picayune that they 
expect evacuation attempts in New Orleans to only be half successful, especially since 
approximately 100,000 people live in households that do not own cars.67 The exercise 
identified the need for 1,000 shelters for evacuees, found locations for 784 shelters, and 
developed a plan to find locations for the remaining shelters.  The state concluded that 
state resources would be sufficient to operate the shelters for 3-5 days, and it made 
arrangements for federal and other resources to replenish state resources.  The exercise 
included a mass immunization plan for tetanus, influenza, and other diseases that could 
become prevalent following a catastrophic hurricane.  The plan identified agencies to 
lead search and rescue teams equipped with up to 800 searchers.  The plan even included 
provisions to repair damaged public schools, erect temporary schools, increase the 
capacity of undamaged schools, and hire additional teachers.68 
Hurricane Katrina Makes Landfall 
 Just one year later, the nightmare storm arrived.  As Hurricane Katrina gained 
strength in the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama braced for a 
devastating storm.  While some people remained hopeful that the storm would weaken or, 
at the very least, avoid a direct strike at New Orleans, it became more likely that a 
devastatingly strong storm, perhaps even a Category 5 hurricane, might pass directly 
through New Orleans.  While the storm gained strength over the warm waters of the Gulf 
of Mexico, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama began to take serious precautions.  The 
states suggested voluntary evacuations, opened emergency shelters, positioned 
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emergency supplies in the shelters, alerted National Guard forces, and activated 
emergency operations centers.  An incredible attempt was made to evacuate New 
Orleans.  Contraflow was initiated on all major highways (i.e. both lanes were directed 
outbound) and approximately 1.2 million people actually evacuated New Orleans and the 
surrounding areas.  FEMA, the military, and nongovernmental organizations positioned 
30 medical teams, 11 million liters of water, 9 million pounds of ice, and 5.9 million 
“meals ready to eat” in neighboring states before the storm made landfall.69 In short, 
tremendous efforts were exerted to prepare the New Orleans area for an extreme weather 
disaster.  The mere fact that these efforts were insufficient is not a reason to dismiss them 
as inconsequential. 
 However, it is important to understand why more people did not evacuate New 
Orleans.  Some people were not capable of leaving because of disabilities or because they 
had no mode of transportation.  Many residents of New Orleans live in poverty and the 
cost of evacuating, especially when many past evacuations turned out to be unnecessary, 
was considered prohibitive.  A significant number of people were also reluctant to 
evacuate because of fear that their property would be looted.  Other people simply 
doubted the accuracy of the weather predictions, perhaps because New Orleans Mayor 
Ray Nagin delayed issuing a mandatory evacuation order until one day before the storm 
hit.  Despite addressing the issue during mock Hurricane Pam, New Orleans did not have 
an adequate evacuation plan.  The city had promised that buses would pick people up at 
12 predetermined locations, but the locations were not marked, and the buses only ran for 
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a few hours.  This left thousands of residents who did not own cars with no way out of 
the city.70 
When the storm made landfall in New Orleans, it had weakened considerably 
from its Category 5 status and made landfall as a borderline Category 3 or Category 4 
hurricane.  Nonetheless, the city’s levee system failed; since the electrical grid also failed, 
the city’s storm pumps were useless.  Contrary to initial fears, New Orleans was not 
destroyed by the force of the hurricane winds but by the rising waters.  For those 
residents stranded in the city, many made their way over to the Superdome, the 
designated shelters for people unable to evacuate.  The Superdome was inundated with 
30,000 people who were stranded in blistering heat with limited food and water for three 
days.  An additional 20,000 people gathered in the Convention Center and lived in similar 
conditions.  CNN reported: 
Rumors of violence and chaos at the Superdome abound – 
one man is reported to have calmly leaped from the second-
level bleachers to his death-but reports vary and some say 
the atmosphere is “not too horrific.” Toilets have been 
overflowing for two days.  The heat is intolerable.  Many 
are ill and in need of medical attention.  There is no 
drinking water.71 
Although city official and the media later admitted that some of the initial reports of 
violence were exaggerated, nobody doubts that the conditions in the Convention Center 
and the Superdome were intolerable.  After three days, officials began evacuating people 
from the city shelters to other shelters throughout the United States. 
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Nongovernmental Organizations 
 For the residents who were able to escape the city, nongovernmental 
organizations provided many essential resources.  The American Red Cross opened 239 
shelters the day the storm hit New Orleans and nearly 300 additional shelters the 
following week.  These shelters accommodated 140,000 evacuees, distributed 31 million 
meals before closing on February 15, 2006, and spent approximately three billion dollars 
in donated money.  The Salvation Army administered an additional 225 shelters 
accommodating 30,000 evacuees.  The Salvation Army operated 11 mobile kitchens 
which served more than 20,000 meals per day.  Of special importance is that these 
nongovernmental resources alone provided shelter for 70% to 95% of the total number of 
people rendered homeless by Hurricane Andrew, the worst natural disaster to ever hit the 
United States prior to Hurricane Katrina.  The contribution that these organizations made 
to the overall disaster response, despite being inadequate, was incredible, and these 
organizations deserve our nation’s respect and gratitude.72 
While nongovernmental organizations were providing shelter to evacuees, 
governmental organizations were providing other emergency services to hurricane 
victims.  Initial concerns that looting would occur following the evacuation orders in 
New Orleans were true.  The New Orleans Police Department literally crumbled in the 
wake of the storm.  Equipment was compromised or destroyed, and many officers did not 
show up for their shifts.  Even at full capacity, the police department would not have been 
able to both maintain order and orchestrate rescue operations.  With reduced capacity, 
looting became a major problem and rescue operations suffered.  Order was not restored 
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to the streets of New Orleans until the National Guard supplemented the police force 
beginning on the fourth or fifth day after the storm. 
The National Guard  
 The National Guard was activated to help maintain law and order in the city as 
well as to assist with rescue efforts.  National Guard troops from states other than those 
affected were dispatched to the region under the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact which is a mutual aid agreement between states.  By August 30, the day after 
the levees were breached 5,804 Louisiana Guardsmen and 178 troops from other states 
were deployed.  By September 8, just one week later, 6,779 Louisiana Guardsmen and 
23,476 troops from other states were deployed to Louisiana.  By the end of the relief 
efforts, 40,000 National Guard troops were deployed under state control and an additional 
30,000 military personnel were deployed under federal control.73 
The federal government was widely criticized, however, for not federalizing the 
National Guard under the president’s control.  According to the Posse Comitatus Act of 
1878, once the National Guard is federalized it cannot act as a police force and cannot 
enforce regular laws.  While nationalizing the force would have improved the overall 
efficiency of federal rescue efforts and enhanced the federal government’s ability to 
deliver supplies in a timely fashion, it also would have reduced the ability to control 
crime in the city.  With the knowledge that excessive crime would also impede rescue 
efforts, the National Guard remained under the governor’s control.  Unfortunately, due to 
the lack of leadership and overall condition of the Louisiana state government, this may 
have been the wrong decision.74 
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FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security 
 Most Americans, when asked who is to blame for the failed emergency response 
to Hurricane Katrina, will probably point to the federal government, in general, and to 
FEMA, in specific.  FEMA is to blame for many of the failures; however, the problems 
are much more systemic and far more widespread than most people realize or care to 
admit.  Most agencies provided many extraordinary services during Hurricane Katrina 
but failed to deliver others. 
 During the first day of the storm, there was extreme confusion over the situation 
in New Orleans.  Even though the levees were considered vulnerable in a storm of this 
magnitude, there was limited information about whether or not the levees had actually 
failed.  Local first responders were responsible for surveying the damage and relaying 
that information to state and federal officials.  However, due to equipment damage, 
personnel shortages, and communication system malfunctions, state and federal officials 
were unable to ascertain the severity of the situation.  All parties knew the situation was 
bad but there was very little information to suggest just how bad.  The White House and 
the Select Bipartisan Committee reports both comment that the condition of the levees 
was uncertain during the first day.  According to the White House report, at 9:12 a.m. on 
August 29 there was a report of a break in the levee system.  However, the White House 
later received information indicating that the flooding was caused by water flowing over 
the top of the levee system and that there was no break.  At 6 p.m. the White House was 
informed that the levee system was not breached, and at 9 p.m. FEMA Director Michael 
Brown said on national television that the levee system had not been breached.  It was not 
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until the next morning that it became clear to federal officials that there were hundreds of 
breaches in the levee system and that most of New Orleans was under water.75 
Only when the severity of the damage was clear, did Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff declare Hurricane Katrina to be an Incident of National 
Significance.  According to the National Response Plan’s Glossary of Terms, an Incident 
of National Significance is: 
An actual or potential high-impact event that requires a 
coordinated and effective response by an appropriate 
combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, 
nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to 
save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for 
long-term community recovery and mitigation of 
activities.76 
Since there was little doubt, even before the severity of the damage was clear, that 
Hurricane Katrina would meet this definition, the delay in making this declaration has 
been widely criticized.  In reality, however, even if Secretary Chertoff had made the 
declaration and a federal coordinating officer had been appointed earlier, it is unlikely 
that the federal response would have been altered substantially.  Even with a federal 
coordinating officer in place, the federal official still would not have known what 
assistance the state needed since local first responders were unable to obtain and relay 
that information.77 Nevertheless, it is possible that the mere declaration of an Incident of 
National Significance would have increased FEMA’s ability to coordinate with other 
agencies by raising the profile of the event.   
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In addition to declaring an Incident of National Significance, however, Secretary 
Chertoff could have declared a Catastrophic Event.  A Catastrophic Event is defined in 
the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Event Annex as: 
Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that 
results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, 
or disruption severely affecting the population, 
infrastructure, environment, economy, national moral, 
and/or government functions.  A catastrophic event could 
result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period 
of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally 
available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector 
authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts 
governmental operations and emergency services to such 
an extent that national security could be threatened…78 
Of particular importance in a Catastrophic Event is the realization that state and local 
resources will be completely overwhelmed almost instantly.  Such a declaration would 
have permitted the federal government to preposition supplies in the disaster region.  In 
theory, this would have been extraordinarily important since the federal government is 
technically not permitted to preposition supplies before an official disaster declaration is 
requested by the state governor and certified by the president.  In reality, however, 
FEMA ignored this regulation and prepositioned supplies without the required 
authorizations.  Thus, although this extraordinary declaration would have raised the 
profile of the event and may have led to additional prepositioning of supplies and 
personnel, it is not clear if it would have significantly altered the federal response.79 
78 Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls will Improve 
the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System.  General Accounting 
Officer Report to Congressional Committees - GAO-06-618 
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Following the storm, when officials were finally able to survey the damage, it was 
concluded that approximately 300,000 homes were destroyed or uninhabitable.80 FEMA, 
in an attempt to assist these families and others, distributed direct financial assistance to 
between 1.4 and 1.7 million households.81 This was an extraordinary effort.  However, 
the system for distributing this money was seriously flawed.  In an attempt to make the 
money available as quickly as possible, FEMA distributed 2.5 million debit cards worth 
$2,000 each to evacuees.  However, 900,000 of these cards went to people with fake 
addresses and $24 million worth of cards were given out without any reasonable 
accountability.82 In its review of the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, 
the General Accounting Office noted the need to more carefully balance quick action 
with appropriate protections against fraud.  The GAO cited examples of unduly slow 
action due to administrative procedures and unjustifiably fast action that resulted in 
excessive fraud.83 
Despite fulfilling its overall obligation to distribute emergency assistance dollars 
to victims, albeit imperfectly, FEMA did not carry out all of its assigned tasks during 
Hurricane Katrina.  In particular, according to the National Response Plan, FEMA’s 
primary role was to distribute relief supplies in and near the disaster zone.  FEMA failed 
to discharge this duty and asked the military to do so in its place just as it had done 
during Hurricane Andrew.  However, in all fairness, it is not clear that any one agency is 
capable of handling all the tasks assigned to FEMA during a catastrophic disaster.  Aside 
from distributing supplies, FEMA was charged with coordinating the activities of all 
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federal agencies, working with the states who were themselves disorganized or operating 
under extreme stress, administering FEMA’s own relief programs, and organizing 
nongovernmental and private sector relief efforts.84 With its limited staff it is not 
surprising that FEMA chose to delegate some of its responsibilities to the military. 
 The decision to delegate some of its responsibilities at the height of the storm, 
however, does not dismiss FEMA’s long-term failure to properly allocate 25,000 trailers 
that were purchased for short-term emergency housing using over $850 million dollars of 
taxpayer money.  By February 2006, only 2,700 of these trailers were installed while 
many of the remaining trailers were stuck in the mud in the flood planes of Hope, 
Arkansas.85 Furthermore, instead of using the closed England Air Force Base in 
Alexandria, Louisiana for medium-term housing, FEMA contracted four cruise ships to 
provide 8,000 cabins at a cost of $5,100 per cabin per month for a total of $249 million 
dollars.86 
When one tries to allocate blame for the failed levees in New Orleans, one is 
stunned by the number of people and government agencies who share the responsibility.  
While one could start 37 years ago when the levee project was first begun, it is easier to 
look at recent history.  The Bush administration included $297 million dollars for civil 
works projects in the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ New Orleans district 
budget.  Congress approved $40 million dollars of which $3 million was allocated to 
repair the levees.  After much debate, $5.5 million dollars was allocated to the project but 
since, according to the project manager, $11 million dollars was needed, the levee project 
was suspended completely.  So blame can be shared among the president, congress, and, 
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perhaps, the project manager for not doing his best with a limited budget; or perhaps the 
blame should be with the previous presidents, congresses, and project managers from the 
past 37 years, not to mention the local and state officials who were involved in the 
project.87 
Need for Improvement: Summary 
 During the period following the immediate catastrophe, government agencies and 
independent analysts had the opportunity to carefully evaluate the overall disaster 
response plan.  Interestingly, the reports by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the White House Homeland Security 
Council, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and FEMA all agreed about the overall weaknesses in the response.88 
In short, many of the same weaknesses that were highlighted following Hurricane 
Andrew reemerged.   
 In particular, FEMA did not have the administrative capacity nor the authority 
within the federal bureaucracy to effectively coordinate the implementation of the 
National Response Plan.  Just as it had been in the past, strong presidential leadership 
was necessary to promote the needed interagency cooperation.  Additionally, although 
FEMA did preposition supplies and personnel for Hurricane Katrina, this was not 
explicitly authorized by the Stafford Act before an official disaster declaration.  
Furthermore, although FEMA prepositioned supplies, other federal, state, and local 
agencies may not have prepositioned supplies since federal reimbursements are not 
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guaranteed until an official disaster declaration is issued.  For that reason, it is widely 
held that this law ought to be revised to ensure that appropriate resources are 
prepositioned when a disaster is predicted.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there 
was no adequate system in place during Hurricane Katrina to provide rapid and accurate 
damage assessment.  For that reason, key decision makers were forced to proceed without 
critical information.  In the National Response Plan, state and local authorities are 
charged with providing these assessments.  However, there is no adequate provision to 
obtain this information when state and local resources are completely overwhelmed as 
was the case during Hurricane Katrina.89 
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Chapter 7: Foreign Models 
 As criticism mounts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina over the inadequateness of 
the American disaster response system, it is important to look at other systems being used 
around the globe.  This comparison process is complicated, however.  The wealth of the 
United States inflates expectations of response capabilities, the size of the nation 
increases the scale and frequency of potential disasters, and the federalist system of 
government complicates the distribution of responsibility for disaster response.  While 
one can look to Great Britain, Spain, Thailand, Israel, and other democratic nations which 
have experienced disasters in recent history, these nations do not share any of these 
characteristics.  For that reason, the only two nations worthy of comparison are Australia 
and Canada, both of which are large and wealthy democratic nations which value the 
independence of their provinces. 
Australia and Canada 
 In Australia and Canada, just as in the United States, emergency management 
agencies at the state, territory, province and local levels are primarily responsible for 
disaster relief.  During most disasters, just as in the United States, the territory, province, 
state and local governments manage the disasters without federal intervention. However, 
when federal assistance is needed, unlike in the United States, there is no need for a 
formal disaster declaration.  When Australian and Canadian disaster relief expenditures 
exceed a predetermined level, federal reimbursements begin; the process is automatic and 
thus depoliticized.  In Australia, depending on the individual fiscal strength of the state or 
territory, either 75%, 90%, or 100% of the response and relief costs are reimbursed.  In 
Canada, federal reimbursement depends on the per capita expenditures and start when the 
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province has spent $1 per capita; the reimbursement level increases on a sliding scale up 
to a maximum of 90% reimbursement when the province has spent more than $5 per 
capita.  During large-scale disasters, the Canadian equivalent of FEMA, the Emergency 
Management and National Security Branch of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and the Australian equivalent of FEMA, Emergency 
Management Australia become involved.  In general, any resources provided by 
Emergency Management Australia or PSEPC operate under the operational direction of 
the state and local governments.  In Australia, even direct federal monetary assistance to 
citizens provided by Emergency Management Australia are administered through state or 
territory collection centers.  In Canada, on rare occasions the federal government 
provides operational assistance through Health Canada or the military.  Since there is no 
Canadian equivalent of the Posse Comitatus Law, the Canadian military is able to assist 
province law enforcement agencies when needed. 
 The Australian and Canadian systems of disaster response have been spared major 
criticism.  The automatic and nonpolitical criterion for activating federal assistance 
moderates political tensions and staves off criticism.  Although both governments place 
more confidence in the ability for states and territories to independently handle the 
operational aspects of disaster response, the overall system is not altogether different than 
that which exists in the United States.  The state, territory, and province governments in 
Australia and Canada, however, are significantly more powerful within the overall 
governmental system and have proportionately more resources than do American state 
governments.  This enhances their abilities to handle disasters but does not demonstrate 
the overall effectiveness of the system during truly catastrophic disasters.  Furthermore, 
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in recent history Australia and Canada have been spared major disasters.  Due to the low 
prevalence of major disaster and the increased reliance on local governments, Australia 
has only spent an average of $3 billion per year and Canada has spent less than $2 billion 
total over the course of the last 35 years on disaster response.  This minimal involvement 
in disaster response activities makes it difficult to ascertain the overall effectiveness of 
the Australian and Canadian systems in comparison to the American system.90 
Summary 
 The underlying structure of the American, Canadian, and Australian disaster 
response system is the same.  State and local governments are given the primary 
responsibility for disaster response although in the United States the federal government 
maintains a larger operational role.  The Australian and Canadian systems, however, are 
completely depoliticized.  Regulations predetermine the exact extent and type of federal 
involvement.  While one could argue that most significant disasters are declared without 
political debate and thus the politicization of the American system does not delay disaster 
relief, the American system may lead to irrationally lenient disaster declarations.  Since 
most presidents do not want to be in the position of denying federal aid to states, the 
federal government frequently becomes entangled in disaster relief operations and 
reimbursements that could have been handled by the states.  This involvement 
overwhelms the federal system and takes the focus off of preparing for truly catastrophic 
disasters. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 The American disaster response system functions admirably during the vast 
majority of disasters.  The system quickly arranges for emergency shelter, food 
distribution, medical care, and monetary distributions to disaster victims.  The system 
even helps effected areas rebuild homes soon after a disaster.  The system functioned 
admirably on 9/11, during the Oklahoma City bombing, and during most earthquakes, 
floods, and hurricanes.  The mutual aid network advocated by FEMA encourages 
neighboring local police, fire, EMS, utility companies, and even the National Guard to 
supplement each others resources, and it works quite well in most cases.  The system 
requires cooperation from state, local, federal, non-profit, for-profit, and other private 
sector organizations.  Each of these organizations offers remarkable services during most 
disasters.91 However, the disaster response system is imperfect since the coordination of 
these fragmented resources is extremely cumbersome; nonetheless, there is no clear 
alternative since each proposed system has its clear drawbacks. 
The Military Model 
 One clear alternative to the current system, for example, is to charge the United 
States military with coordinating and implementing all disaster relief preparations and 
operations.  At first glance, this seems logical.  The military is the single resource at the 
government’s disposal that is capable of performing all the operational duties and 
obligations currently assigned by the National Response Plan.  The military, even with 
the restrictions of the Stafford Act and Posse Comitatus Act, can be activated on short 
notice and is capable of simultaneously surveying damage, performing dangerous rescue 
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operations, providing emergency medical care, erecting temporary housing, establishing 
emergency communication systems, and maintaining overall peace.  Furthermore, since 
these skills are needed during wars, the military is capable of fulfilling many of these 
tasks at present without further investment or coordination.  For this reason, Dr. Irwin 
Redlener, the Director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia 
University, advocates that the United States assign the military a much more prominent 
role in disaster response and preparedness.92 
The military’s operational capacity, however, should not be misinterpreted as a 
reason to militarize the responsibility for disaster response and preparedness.  A major 
criticism of the current structure is that FEMA is located deep within the bureaucratic 
framework of the Department of Homeland Security, and thus disaster response is not the 
department’s first priority.  If the military were given primary responsibility for disaster 
preparedness and response, it would necessarily subordinate both preparedness and 
response to the military’s other national security concerns.  For that reason the military 
must be made aware that it may be called upon at an instants notice to provide substantial 
assistance during catastrophic disasters but the military should not be tasked with the 
overall responsibility for coordinating and implementing the American disaster 
preparedness and response system.  Preparedness responsibilities, grant administration, 
and other essential administrative tasks would likely be neglected. 
Personal Recommendations 
 In reality, despite the clear failures enumerated in this paper, the overall concept 
of shared responsibility for disaster response, with some significant changes, is ideal.  It 
is respectful of the American federalist tradition and can be extraordinarily effective if 
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structured appropriately.  Each state should maintain its own self-sustaining disaster 
response system capable of handling all but the most catastrophic disasters.  Operational 
assistance from the federal government for ordinary disasters should be reduced and 
perhaps even eliminated since the scale of these disasters can feasibly be handled using 
state resources, including the National Guard under the governor’s control.   
 Despite increased reliance on state resources, the federal government should 
continue to offer the states and affected citizens financial assistance; however, the 
distribution of this assistance should be the responsibility of the states.  In other words, 
the federal government’s involvement in responding to ordinary disasters should be 
minimal.  The Canadian and Australian systems demonstrate that this model, which 
places the burden of preparedness on the states, is feasible.  Furthermore, just as is the 
case is Canada and Australia, the initiation of federal financial assistance should be based 
on objective standards.  These changes will enable FEMA to focus almost exclusively on 
preparing for catastrophic disasters.  This change will eliminate day-to-day pressing 
issues that prevent FEMA’s 2,500 full-time employees93 from focusing on its primary 
mission which is to supplement state resources when they are completely overwhelmed. 
 In every disaster in recent time, FEMA has struggled to achieve adequate 
cooperation from other federal agencies.  An adequate disaster response may require 
cooperation from dozens of different federal agencies most of which could not be 
practically subordinated to FEMA.  For that reason, FEMA should be extracted from the 
Department of Homeland Security and the vice-president of the United States should be 
officially charged with overseeing and coordinating federal disaster efforts during 
catastrophic disasters.  During Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, as well as during most 
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other recent catastrophic disasters, a high level administration official has been charged 
as the ad hoc disaster coordinator to help FEMA navigate the complex federal 
bureaucracy.  The American people would be better served if one high level 
administration official was given that formal responsibility.  The vice-president is the 
federal official, aside from the president, most able to remove bureaucratic obstacles and 
circumnavigate inappropriate federal policies during an emergency.  During Hurricane 
Katrina, the Coast Guard was widely credited with providing the best disaster relief and 
saving the most lives.  One primary reason that the Coast Guard was so successful was 
probably its institutional approach.  Coast Guard commanders recognized that their 
primary mission was to save lives and thus circumvented ordinary operating procedures 
to do so.  While individual agencies are capable of adjusting operations, only the vice-
president or other similarly high-ranking official is capable of forcing such an 
institutional approach across the federal bureaucracy. 
 The system used to activate federal disaster response efforts, however, also 
requires improvement.  In Hurricane Katrina, for example, the state delayed its formal 
request for federal disaster assistance, failed to accurately assess the damage, and failed 
to request appropriate aid from the federal government.  An improved federal disaster 
response system would permit FEMA to determine, without state approval, when to 
activate the federal catastrophic disaster system.  The system should permit the federal 
government to legally preposition supplies and even spend preparedness dollars when a 
potential disaster is predicted; these precautions should be taken with the full realization 
that sometimes predicted disasters will not occur. 
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These suggested changes would force a dramatic change in the focus of disaster 
preparedness.  It would prevent politically motivated federal disaster involvement and 
force the federal government to take an active role in preparing for and responding to 
catastrophic disasters.  However, this system will not avoid the general bureaucratic 
problems that pervade the American democratic system.  John J. DiIulio, Jr., Gerald 
Garvey, and Donald F. Kettl note in their book, Improving Government Performance: An 
Owner’s Manual:
Political micromanagement and the mismatch of 
government’s tools with its problems have crippled public 
management, increased government inefficiency, and 
impeded performance.  Perhaps worst of all, they have 
provoked a widespread distrust of the American system: by 
elected officials, who cannot understand why 
administrators do not produce better results; by 
administrators, who complain about constant interference 
by elected officials as they try to do their jobs; and by 
citizens, who curse elected officials and administrators for 
squabbling among themselves and for overlooking why 
they are there to begin with.94 
These overall government shortfalls will continue to effect disaster response and 
preparedness.  Implementing these suggested improvements would require Congress to 
pass new legislation and the Executive Branch to restructure administrative 
responsibilities.  However, if these changes can be implemented, by focusing FEMA only 
on catastrophic disasters and charging the vice-president with the overall responsibility 
for success, there is a chance to improve government efficiency, accountability, and 
performance.   
 In conclusion, even a strengthened federal capacity to handle catastrophic 
disasters will not be perfect.  Catastrophic disasters will continue to affect American 
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citizens, destroy families, and cause inexplicable suffering.  Even bolstered state and 
federal disaster response capabilities will be incapable of providing instant relief to 
everyone.  For that reason, people will continue to rely on local first responders, non-
profit organizations, and their neighbors.  The strengthened catastrophic disaster response 
system must be respectful of the services offered by these entities.  In fact, it must 
encourage these individuals and organizations to do more, not less.  In the book, 
Americans at Risk, Dr. Irwin Redlener recalls a conversation he had with a Chaplain in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  The Chaplain asked, "Could we have done better than this? It 
looks like a military POW camp or a refugee village in the Third World."  He then 
answered himself: 
Of Course.  And it didn't need to be government's job 
alone.  There are scores of churches and community 
organizations that were willing and able to absorb 
everybody who's now trapped in here.  They would have 
fed and clothed all of these people.  They would have 
helped families get back on their feet and made sure that 
the kids got the medical care they needed.  And they 
certainly would have made sure that every child got into 
school.95 
This is not to dismiss the government’s role in disaster response.  However, in improving 
federal coordination and response to catastrophic disasters it is essential that all available 
resources are maximized.  Faith based organizations have proven their ability to provide 
essential services during and after disasters.  Collegiate Emergency Medical Services 
organizations, such as Tulane EMS, are essential resources located throughout the nation 
that should not be neglected.  Community safety teams and volunteer rescue teams should 
not be forgotten.   
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Routine disasters will strike the United States several times in the coming years.  
Nobody knows for sure when the next catastrophic disaster will strike.  However, 
everyone knows that America has not experienced its last catastrophic disaster.  Creating 
a truly comprehensive federal disaster preparedness and response plan requires 
unprecedented coordination, resources, and accountability.  Extracting FEMA from the 
Department of Homeland Security, refocusing its resources on catastrophic disaster 
preparedness, and making the vice-president accountable for the program’s success 
would be several steps in the right direction.  However, ultimate success will require 
more than administrative steps.  Dr. Redlener refers to these administrative changes as 
“the easy issues” and writes, “Far more difficult, however, is the grueling work of 
examining and addressing the pertinent underlying issues that genuinely interfere with 
long-term, meaningful improvements in the level of national preparedness.”96 
Nonetheless, these administrative changes are necessary to make comprehensive 
improvements to the system possible. 
 
96 Redlener, American At Risk, 200. 
